Showing posts with label Criticism of the Left Front Government of West Bengal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Criticism of the Left Front Government of West Bengal. Show all posts

Thursday, December 24, 2009

NREGS Workers In West Bengal To Lose Rs. 146 crores

http://www.unionbook.org/pg/pages/view/20404/


On 17th December 2009 Shri Anisur Rehman, Panchayat Minister of West Bengal, announced at a press conference that NREGS wages were being revised to Rs.100 per day. What these statements however do not reveal is how the State Governments have cheated NREGS workers of their rightful arrear payments by about Rs.500-Rs.1000 per job card holder.

Wage revision for NREGS has been in the offing since February 2009 , when Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee declared in his budget speech that they would pay Rs.100 as wages for NREGA in 2009-10. Rural Development Ministry (GoI) soon after that asked states to send in request for revision of wages. It said later that it was willing to pay revised wages with retrospective effect from 1st April 2009.

West Bengal Government, disregarding even the fact that the West Bengal legal minimum wage for agricultural workers was Rs.87.50 from 1st April onwards, asked for a revision to Rs.81 only from the Central Government. In protest, Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity(PBKMS) wrote on 27th July 2009 to Dr MN Roy , Principal Secretary, Panchayat and Rural Development Department, asking for at least minimum wages of Rs.87.50 to be paid and later on 20th November 2009 asking for Rs.100.

In addition, the National Alliance of Agricultural Worker Unions (of which PBKMS and JADS are members) also brought the issue of revising wages and removing the 100 days cap in view of the drought and spiralling prices to the attention of the Central Employment Guarantee Council through its letter dated 6th October 2009. In response, the Central Government informed the National Alliance that they were willing to revise wages to Rs.100 if the State Governments requested them to do so. The Central Government also stated that the cap on 100 days could also be lifted, again if the State Governments used the funds provided to them under the Calamity Relief Fund.

It has now been notified that the West Bengal Government will pay Rs.87.50 from 2nd December 2009 and Rs. 100 from 1st January 2009. On the whole this means that workers in West Bengal have lost Rs.19 per person day since 1st April 2009. (Rs.100-Rs81). This is a massive loss for the State and for NREGS workers.

Till date the number of person days generated in West Bengal from 1st April 2009 has been 770.16 lakh person days. So West Bengal has failed to claim Rs.14633.04 lakhs (Rs.19 X 770.16 ).

Also so far 29800.35 households have been provided with this work. So each household has lost Rs.491 ( Rs.14633.04 lakhs divided by 29800.35).

In December, a further loss of about Rs. 494 can be expected by each household that works this month. i.e Rs.19 per day for 26 working days.

The Government seems to feel that it is difficult administratively to give arrears. They may also fear that it will lead to corruption and misappropriation. We would like to know if any administrative problem ever stands in the way of paying arrears to Government employees. We would also like to know if the non payment of arrears to poor agricultural workers who are NREGS workers will mean a stop to corruption. We say these are only excuses and we demand instead that the State Government should arrange for payment of arrears.

While on the one hand the Left Front constituent parties are making a big noise all over the country about the exorbitant price rise and its impact on the common man, on the other hand the West Bengal Left Front Government has once again shown that it is least concerned about the plight of agricultural workers. It should be noted here that the Tripura Left Front Government, controlled by the same parties, has revised NREGS wages with effect from 1st April 2009.


Swapan Ganguly

General Secretary

Monday, October 20, 2008

Hidden Costs of the Tata-Singur Agreement

http://sanhati.com/front-page/987/

By Dipankar Basu, Sanhati.

The Tata Group of Companies is one of the largest business conglomerates in India today with about 100 large companies in its fold. With the might of the Indian State firmly behind it, monopoly capital in India has started a move to aggressively acquire foreign assets. In the last few years, the Tata Group has been leading this acquisition spree on behalf of Indian big capital, making forays not only in Asia and Africa but also in the heartland of world capitalism: USA and Europe. Let us briefly take a look at the record of the Tata Group with regard to foreign acquisitions.

In January 2007, the Tata Group pulled off India’s biggest ever takeover of a foreign company to buy Anglo-Dutch steel-maker Corus for $12 billion; this acquisition made the combined entity (Tata-Corus) the world’s fifth largest producer of steel. In March 2004, the Tata Group acquired South Korea’s Daewoo Commercial Vehicle Company for $102 million; this was followed by the acquisition of a 21 percent stake in Spanish bus maker Hispano Carrocera for $18 million with an option to pick up the remaining stake at a later date. Around the same time, Tata Technologies, another company in the Tata fold, which provides automotive engineering and design services, bought Britain’s Incat International for $53 million.

Tata Consultancy Services, which was earlier a division of Tata Sons and a rising star in the Tata Group, has been among the most aggressive shoppers for foreign companies. It has acquired six companies in the past few years, with the net value of the deals close to $100 million; these include FNS of Australia, which was acquired for $26 million and Chile’s outsourcing major Comicrom, which was bought for $23 million. When the Tata Group acquired the former state-run, international telecom carrier, VSNL, a few years ago, it was on it’s way to becoming a major telecom player in the global markets. To enhance it’s position, it acquired undersea cable company Tyco of the US for $130 million, Internet service provider Dishnet’s India division for $64.28 million and international telecom service provider Teleglobe of the US for $239 million.

Following its acquisition of Hindustan Lever Chemicals, Tata Chemicals was on the lookout for a steady supply of phosphoric acid for its newly acquired plant at Haldia, West Bengal. Accordingly, it took over two overseas companies for a total value of $215 million: Indo Maroc Phosphore of Morocco in March 2005 and Brunner Mond Group of Britain in December 2007. Morocco, by the way, produces over 50 percent of the world’s rock phosphate.

In 2000, Tata Tea bought British giant Tetley for a $407 million, and started looking for similar deals to strenghthen it’s global position in the tea and related drinks business. This search led to acquisition of 33 percent stake in the South African company Joekels Tea Packers for an undisclosed amount and 30 percent stake in the US-based favoured water manufacturer Glaceau for $677 million, the acquisition of the US-based Good Earth Corp for $32 million and acquisition of the Czech Republic’s firm Jemca for an unknown amount.

India Hotels, the hotel branch of the Tata Group, acquired several hotels abroad for $121 million in the past few years. It is reported to have set aside $100 million for future acquisitions in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and the US. In December 2006, it had acquired W, a hotel at the Woolloomooloo Bay in Sydney; it was followed by the taking over of the management of The Pierre, a luxurious landmark hotel on New York’s Fifth Avenue. India Hotels, which runs the Taj Group of hotels, has 39 hotels in India and 18 worldwide. A recent acquisition of India Hotels was Campton Place Hotel in San Francisco

This is not a complete list; it is just a representative list of the Tata Group’s recent foreign acquisitions. It is only meant to provide some ballpark figures about the amount that the Tata Group has spent in the last few years in expanding it’s business abroad and in acquisition of costly strategic corporate assets. This decidedly incomplete information about the Tata Groups `acquisition spree’ is also meant to serve as an introduction to the agreement that was recently signed by the West Bengal Government and Tata Motors Ltd. (TML) for setting up `a manufacturing Plant for Automobile Products’ in Police Station Singur of District Hoogly in West Bengal. If we add up the figures for Tata Group’s overseas acquisitions, we arrive at a rough figure of $14,062 million, which converts to roughly Rs. 56,248 crore (using an exchange rate of Rs 40/$).

Of course what this implies is that a corporation which can invest more than Rs. 56,000 crores for acquisition of foreign companies requires the financial support of India’s taxpayers to set up a plant in India!

Because that is what the recently concluded agreement between the TML and the West Bengal government boils down to. Take point 7(a) of the agreement as an example. This refers to the loans that the WBIDC will give to the TML in the form of tax holidays for 30 years (i.e., TML will not have to pay the usual taxes to the WB government for about 30 years). The loan will be essentially at a nominal interest rate of 0%, which is just another way of saying that the TML gets a loan at negative real interest rates (i.e., negative of the annual rate of inflation). So, in real terms the WBIDC will not only give a loan to the TML but will also pay interest to TML for the loan that it has given to the TML! From the perspective of TML, it would be difficult to think of a better example of `having the cake and eating it too’. But make no mistake. This largesse to the corporate sector is essential if we are to embark on a path of industrialization. Or so the West Bengal government would have us believe.

The last part of 7(a) seems even better. It says: `WBIDC will ensure that the loan under this head is paid within 60 days of the close of the previous year (on 31st March) failing which WBIDC will be liable to compensate TML for the financial inconvenience caused @ 1.5 times the bank rate prevailing at the time on the amount due for the period of such delay’. What does this mean?

It means that if the WBIDC is not able to make the loan to TML within 60 days of the close of the financial year, it will penalise ITSELF by compensating TML at 1.5 times the bank rate. Wonderful! And what is the interest rate charged on the loan? 0%. Fantastic. What if TML is not able or willing to pay back the loan? Doesn’t matter. WBIDC will move on. There is no mention of any penalty that might be slapped on TML for failure to pay back the loan (principal or interest)! Any collateral? No. This is `prudent banking’ at it’s best! But make no mistake. This novel and ultimately unbeatable form of prudent banking is essential if West Bengal is to embark on the path of industrialization. Or so the West Bengal government would have us believe.

But there is more. 7(c) of the agreement says: `The West Bengal Govt. will provide TML a loan of 200 crores @ 1% interest per year repayable in 5 equal installments starting from the 21st year from the date of the disbursement of the loan’. This loan, moreover, `will be disbursed within 60 days of this agreement’. This loan will not only cover the payments that TML has to make for the 645.6 acres of land that has been given to it by the government but also cover it’s other possible costs of setting up the plant and starting operations; and the real interest rate is again negative! Then there is the `virtual gift of 650 acres of prime land to Tata Housing Development Company (THDC) in Rajarhat New Town and in the adjoining Bhangar Rajarhat Area Development Authority for building an IT and residential township along with WBIDC as a partner‘, which was portrayed as `infrastructural support’ for the Singur project!

It is important, therefore, for us to recognize the true character of agreements like the one `struck’ between the TML and the West Bengal government. It is important to understand how such `agreements’ look like under a neo-liberal regime. It is important for left and progressive activists, but also the concerned citizens, to realize that all such agreements essentially are geared towards the State effectively subsidizing capital with the revenues earned from direct and indirect taxes, which anyway the corporate entities always try to avoid paying. As has been demonstrated, the Tata Group has enough resources to buy out European and US firms, but when it comes to `industrializing’ a poor state like West Bengal, it requires soft loans (with effectively negative interest rates) and other subsidies like tax exemptions to even consider making `investments’. One must ask the functionaries of the West Bengal government whether this is industrialization or exploitation? It seems to us that the entire TML-Singur project is a net loss for the people of West Bengal. This is simply because the losses are direct, immediate and tangible (with the money going out of the exchequer, revenue loss in terms of tax rebates, loss of agricultural land and loss of livelihoods) whereas the gains are intangible and at the moment residing in the realm of possibility (possible employment generation, possible investment-friendly image and what not).

*********************************

Agreement between Tata Motors Ltd., Government of West Bengal and WBIDC

1. Tata Motors Ltd. (TML) was intending to set up a manufacturing Plant for Automobile Products including “Tata Small Car” to manufacture 250,000 cars per annum on 2 shift basis which could be expanded to 350,000 on 3 shift basis. In addition, it would have several Vendors and act as a mother plant for many aggregates to tune of 500,000 cars. In this connection, TML was considering locating the plant in the States of Uttarakhand/ Himachal Pradesh in view of the fiscal incentive package for the rapid industrialization being made available by the Govt. of India to new Industries in these States which has been attracting a large number of industries to these States. The incentive package in Uttarakhand/Himachal Pradesh consists of:-
(a) 100% exemption from Excise Duty for 10 years.
(b) 100% exemption from Corporate Income Tax for first 5 years and 30% exemption from Corporate Income Tax for next 5 years.

2. The Government of West Bengal (GoWB) is keen to take appropriate steps for rapid industrialization in West Bengal and in this connection wanted to attract some major Automobile Projects to the State. The Government of West Bengal approached TML to persuade them to locate an Automobile Project including the project to manufacture “Tata Small Car” in West Bengal. TML showed interest in locating the plant in West Bengal, provided the State gave Fiscal incentive equivalent to the value of total incentives it would have received by locating the plant in Uttarakhand / Himachal Pradesh. GoWB offered to match the financial incentives in equivalent terms and invited TML to set up the Small Car plant in West Bengal entailing investment of over Rs. 1500 crores by TML. In addition, Vendors supporting the project are likely to make further investment of over Rs. 500 crores.

3. Since then numerous discussions have been held and based on this understanding, GoWB proceeded with identification of various lands for this mega project. Land of approximately 1000 acres chosen in P. S. Singur of District Hooghly was finalized with TML. West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (WBIDC) commenced the process of acquisition of this land. The process was completed with the Declaration of Award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, and thereafter WBIDC has obtained mutation of ownership in its name in the Record-of-Rights, and conversion of usage of the land from agriculture to factory.

4. WBIDC is in possession of 997.11 acres of land, which has been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Out of this, an area admeasuring 645.67 acres will be leased to TML for setting up the Automobile Project including the small car plant, while an area admeasuring 290 acres will be leased to the vendors to this Automobile Project approved by TML (ancillary and component manufacturing units), 14.33 acres will be handed over by WBIDC to WBSEB only for construction of 220/132/33 KV substation and the balance admeasuring 47.11 acres will be used by WBIDC for rehabilitation activities for the needy families amongst the Project affected persons.

5. The terms of lease to TML for the 645.67 acres of land for the mother plant are described below. In addition, WBIDC will provide on lease 290 acres of land to the Vendors selected and approved by TML on payment of Premium equal to the actual cost of acquisition plus incidentals, to be calculated on the basis of the total acquisition cost and other incidental expenses expended by WBIDC or any of its subsidiaries (duly certified by its auditor) averaged over the total land acquired. The lease rental payable per year per acre by the vendors will be Rs. 8000/- per acre for the first 45 (forty five) years and Rs. 16000/- per acre for the next 45 (forty five) years. The initial lease tenure will be 90 years. On expiry of 90 years, the lease terms will be fixed on mutually agreed terms at that point of time.

6. The parties also discussed mutually to finalise the package of incentives required in order to enable GoWB to fulfill its commitment to match in equivalent financial terms the fiscal incentive foregone by TML in Uttarakhand. The Net Present Value (NPV) computation of benefits that the project would have received in Uttarakhand is attached in Annexure I which is agreed to by all the parties. Sample computation of benefits in West Bengal with stated assumptions is given in Annexure II which is accepted by all parties as agreed basis of computation. The NPV is calculated @ 11%.

7. Accordingly, it is finally agreed, in supersession of all previous decisions and agreements in this regard, that for this mega project, the fiscal incentives under Industrial Promotion Assistance in terms of the West Bengal Incentive Scheme (WBIS 2004), assistance towards land cost and interest subsidy in the form of a loan against a quantum of the term loan to be taken by TML for this project will be offered by GoWB as follows:-

(a) WBIDC will provide Industrial Promotion Assistance in the form of a Loan to TML at 0.1% interest per annum for amounts equal to gross VAT and CST received by GoWB in each of the previous years ended 31st March on sale of “Tata Small Car” from the date of commencement of sales of the small car. This benefit will continue till the balance amount of the Uttarakhand benefit (after deducting the amount as stated in para 7b and 7c below) is reached on net present value basis, after which it shall be discontinued. The loan with interest will be repayable in annual installments starting from 31st year of commencement of sale from the plant. The loan availed in the first year will be repaid in the 31st year and the loan availed in the 2nd year will be repaid in the 32nd year and so on. WBIDC will ensure that the loan under this head is paid within 60 days of the close of the previous year (on 31st March) failing which WBIDC will be liable to compensate TML for the financial inconvenience caused @ 1.5 times the bank rate prevailing at the time on the amount due for the period of such delay. TML & GoWB will make best efforts to maximize sale of products from the “Small Car Plant” in the State of West Bengal.

(b) WBIDC will provide 645.67 acres of Land to Tata Motors Ltd on a 90 year lease, on an annual lease rental of Rs. 1 crore per year for first 5 years with an increase @ 25% after every 5 years till 30 years. On expiry of 30 years, the lease rental will be fixed at Rs. 5 crores per year, with an increase @ 30% after every 10 years till the 60th year. On the expiry of 60 years, the lease rental will be fixed at Rs. 20 crores per year, which will remain unchanged till the 90th year. On expiry of 90 years the lease terms will be fixed on mutually agreed terms at that point of time. The benefit on account of land would be calculated as the total land area leased out to TML multiplied by the cost of acquisition calculated in the manner as provided in para 5 less NPV of rent payable during 60 years.

(c) The West Bengal Govt. will provide to TML a loan of Rs. 200 crores bearing @ 1% interest per year repayable in 5 equal annual installments starting from the 21st year from the date of disbursement of loan. This loan will be disbursed within 60 days of signing of this Agreement.

(d) The West Bengal Government will provide Electricity for the project at Rs. 3/- per KWH. In case of more than Rs. 0.25 per KWH increase in tariff in every block of five years, the Government will provide relief through additional compensation to neutralize such additional increase.

8. It is also agreed that the computation of the comparison of benefits in Annexure I and II will be changed if there are any changes in the rates of excise duty and corporate income tax during the next 10 years.

Saturday, July 26, 2008

Land Acquisition and Industrialisation in West Bengal : Report of a Workshop

http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article205.html

by Arup Kumar Sen

Saturday 7 July 2007


The land acquisition drive of the Left Front Government for promoting industries is at present the most controversial public issue in West Bengal. Recently (on April 20), the Centre for Studies in Social Science, Calcutta, organised a one-day workshop on the topic: Agriculture to Industry: The Problem of Transformation.

In his opening remarks, Sugata Marjit, the present Director of the Centre, made it clear that the “CSSSC has no institutional and official position on the policy of industrialisation as far as the present Left Front Government is concerned”. He also opined that the question of industrialisation should be judged academically, not politically.

Kalyan Sanyal’s deliberation—Industrialisation in West Bengal: Some Inescapable Questions—raised critical questions about the government’s policy of industrialisation. He argued that the rhetoric of industrialisation used in the government campaign has been picked up from undergraduate textbooks of economics. He criticised the government for this casual approach to industrialisation which would displace thousands of people.

Sanyal further stated that agriculture did fairly well in West Bengal upto the mid-1990s in terms of production. After that, the cost of production went up because of withdrawal of subsidies but the prices of agricultural products did not go up. There are indications that for small and marginal farmers land is no longer viable in West Bengal. And a sizeable number of peasants having pattas sold their land in recent years. But, because of land ceiling regulations, small peasants are buying and selling lands among themselves, stated Sanyal.

Sanyal accepted the need for industrialisation in West Bengal, but he expressed his dissatisfaction about the government policy. He argued that no calculation has been made by the government about the net employment to be created through its proposed industries. He pointed out that the government talks about the linkage effect of industrialisation, but is silent about the loss of agriculture-related occupations. When asked about the alternative path of industrialisation, Sanyal stated that a sizable number of people have got employment in the non-farm sector in West Bengal in recent times without any government effort. So, one has to know the possibilities of alternative employment. He highlighted the need for a sound compensation policy in case of land acquisition keeping in mind the complexities of land tenure in West Begnal. He cited the case of Singur to show the limits of cash compensation to farmers because loss of land implies loss of source of livelihood and makes life vulnerable.

Surajit C. Mukhopadhyay discussed the interface between politics and economy in his paper—The Politics of Land Acquisition in West Bengal. He stated at the outset that after coming to power in 1977 the Left Front Government took a series of land reform measures within the constitutional framework. The process of land reforms led to politicisation of the peasantry. But, by the mid-1980s, land reforms became stagnant, argued Mukhopadhyay.

Mukhopadhyay revisited the land acquisition question in the context of South Bengal. He argued that South Bengal’s density of population is very high and that led to fragmentation of holdings. Though the fertility of land is high in this part of Bengal, because of rise in input costs peasants just do subsistence farming and do not opt for multiple cropping. Mukhopadhyay claimed that because of the poor state of affairs in agriculture in this region, out-migration to other Indian States in search of livelihood is gaining momentum.

Having interviewed landowners-cum-cultivators in Hooghly, Mukhopadhyay and his team came to the conclusion that 14 per cent of the farmers did not want their next generations, who have education, to pursue farming because cultivation no longer pays. He said that during his teaching career in Burdwan University some years back he also came to know about the dismal conditions of agriculture from students coming from cultivator families.

Though Mukhopadhyay more or less supported the industrialisation venture of the government, he confessed that there is tremendous middle-class pressure on the government and that it has to take care of middle-class aspirations as the representative of a multi-class social formation.

ABHIRUP SARKAR’S paper—Development versus Displacement: Story of Land Acquisitions in West Bengal—was concerned with the associated problems of industrialisation. He argued that the theoretical literature on development economics has largely ignored the problems of land acquisition for industrialisation. He observed in this connection that around one lakh acres of land planned to be acquired by the government for industries represent a small fraction of 14 million acres of cultivated land in West Bengal. So, this will not pose a major problem of food security in the State. He also hinted at the possibility of increasing the average size of landholdings by shifting people to industry on the assumption that the latter will sell their land to the remaining landholders.

Sarkar argued that the government violated property rights during land reforms by confiscating land and transferring land to the landless people. Now, the same government is doing so by transferring land from small farmers to rich investors. In the light of fragmentation of landholding in West Bengal, Sarkar argued that the transaction cost will be very high if the industrialists directly acquire land from the landholders. Ideally speaking, argued Sarkar, the government can ensure fair price for the small farmers who cannot effectively bargain with a powerful buyer.

Sarkar raised the fundamental question as to whether West Bengal being a practising democracy can follow a path of coercion for land acquisition. He categorically stated that the Chinese path of industrialisation is not possible here. In China, land acquisition and industrial growth took place on the basis of secured property rights for investors and loosely defined rights for landowning farmers.

Sarkar argued that in the light of poor conditions of villages in West Bengal and non-profitability of agriculture, there is no alternative to industrialisation. But, he, criticised the government for the failure to develop infrastructure in rural Bengal and emphasised the need for a sound compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement policy. He noted in this context that a cost-benefit analysis of industrialisation is entirely missing in the policy statements of the government. He expressed his reservation about the fact that registered bargadars are getting only 25 per cent of sale proceeds in the land acquisition process whereas they are supposed to get 75 per cent of the produce under the barga system. He concluded by saying that the views of the people, who are losing their land and livelihood, should be given due recognition in the land acquisition policy of the government.

The last session of the workshop was a panel discussion. Alok Mukherjea blamed the West Bengal Government for carrying the land acquisition policy hastily without going through the process of trust-building. Anirban Chattopadhyay pointed the incompetence of the government in properly handling the crisis of agriculture. He suggested that the government had the option of developing cooperatives for the resurrection of agriculture. Gautam Gupta viewed the land acquisition problem to be basically a management problem and criticised the Opposition for politicising the issue for electoral gains. Ratan Khasnobis argued that the cost of transformation initiated by the government is being passed to the weaker sections of the population. Keeping in mind the recent violence connected with land acquisition, Anup Sinha stated categorically that even a single killing is a crime and should be condemned

Monday, June 30, 2008

The poor poetry of industrialisation

http://www.himalmag.com/2007/february/opinion1.htm


The Communist Party of India (Marxist) in wonderland.

by | Aditya Nigam


bilash rai

The West Bengal Chief Minister and the ruling Left Front (LF) government’s former poet-commissar, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, translator of Mayakovsky, is busy with another kind of poetry these days. He is transposing the ‘poetry’ of industrialisation – as it happened on the soil of England – onto the land called Bengal. Dazzled by the dreamworld of capital, Buddhadeb has been quick to shake off the shackles of his earlier convictions and seek aesthetic pleasure in his new role as the ‘Commissar of Industry and Progress’. For quite some time now, Bhattacharya has been trying to convince prospective investors to take the leftists at their word when they say they really are in favour of neo-liberal reforms: “We are realists and we know it’s either reform or perish.” Progress, he understands, entails the death of all that is archaic – revolutionary convictions and agriculture, for instance.

Rapid industrialisation is the only way forward, and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are the quickest way to industrialise. The idea of SEZs has been directly imported into India – and indeed into West Bengal – from China, and from the neo-liberal’s point of view, such units are the important first step in the direction of the brave new world of capital. Eventually, these enthusiasts intend to extend to the entire country the facilities enjoyed by SEZs – tax holidays, exemption from labour laws, unrestricted import facilities, cheap land taken over from Adivasis and peasants, and the freedom of unrestrained exploitation of natural resources.

China is Bhattacharya’s immediate inspiration and justification; but alas, unlike in China, he has a democracy to deal with. The process of industrialisation that Bhattacharya and his party, the CPI(M), have initiated would be every bit as ruthless and violent as it is in China – but for this fact of democracy, which allows the peasants to manifest their resistance.

Thus it happened that on 1 December 2006, several thousand police and paramilitary troops descended on a small and obscure place, the name of which very few outside the state of West Bengal had heard of: Singur. They came to fence off an area of 997 acres of prime agricultural land in Hooghly District so that it could be handed over to the Tata conglomerate, who would establish on it a plant for the manufacture of cheap cars.

What happened in Singur revealed in a flash to all of rural Bengal the plan for the much advertised industrialisation programme: The peasants would be dispossessed at any cost to clear the way. The police fired teargas and rubber bullets at the protesting villagers. They were beaten up and their paddy harvests set on fire. For the peasants did not give up their land voluntarily.

The anger among the local population has been building up ever since the news of the Tatas’ plans for the factory reached Singur in May 2006, even as the newly-elected Left Front government was taking oath. As mass discontent became apparent, various smaller leftwing organisations, especially Naxalite groups and intellectuals, started becoming involved. The involvement of Medha Patkar, leader of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) and the National Alliance of Peoples’ Movements (NAPM), helped draw attention to the issue, while the active championing of the cause of the peasants and sharecroppers by the Trinamool Congress leader Mamata Banerjee brought in the dimension of electoral calculus.

Weak wicket
The Bhattacharya government has been claiming that the acquisition process has been transparent and democratic, and that of the 997 acres required for the project, the consent of the owners had already been acquired for 952 acres by December. These owners – so claimed the LF government and the CPI(M) leader Brinda Karat – had not only given their consent, but were enthusiastically queuing up for the attractive cash compensation package. In a show that smacked of manipulation, the CPI(M) even got these villagers to set up an organisation to “support industrialisation”. Revealingly – and a trifle farcically – it was called ‘Pragatisheel Swechchha Jomi Bikreta, Shilpa Sthapan O Shahar Unnayan Committee (Committee of Progressive, Voluntary Land-Sellers, Supporters of Industrialisation and City Development)’. These people were apparently dying to give up their land at prices far below the market rate for the noble cause of industrialisation! Be the case of the ‘land-seller’ as it may, what about the animal called the sharecropper? What about the people who work the land but do not own it? What about those for whom the CPI(M) had in the early 1980s devised the well-known ‘Operation Barga’, to protect their tenure by means of registration? By the time Singur happened, however, the landless peasant/sharecropper had all but disappeared from CPI(M)’s horizon. When cornered, the party’s leaders said they had ensured that the landless would be given jobs in the factory. Given that all labour laws are null and void within an SEZ, it was left unclear how CPI(M) would ensure that the job guarantee would be affected.

Critics have pointed out that even government statistics show 333,372 hectares of fallow and 119,146 hectares of uncultivable land available in West Bengal, in addition to over 40,000 acres of land locked in mills and factories no longer functioning, which could be used for the purpose of setting up a new factory. Amitdyuti Kumar, vice-president of the Association for the Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR), also refers to a memorandum submitted by the CPI(M) MP Santasri Chatterjee, president of the Hooghly District chapter of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, to the local district magistrate, demanding use of such premises for the establishment of new industrial units.

Interestingly, Chatterjee’s memorandum also states that the Birlas were given 744 acres in 1948 in order to set up Hind Motors in the district, but that they only used 252 acres – 500 acres had remained unused for 58 years. Critics argue that automobile factories, including the Tatas’ own, do not need such large parcels of land. They also point out that, even by Tata Motors’ estimates, there is no way the project will generate more than 2000 jobs. Yet the number of people losing livelihoods, including sharecroppers, is likely to be in the region of 15,000.

The government’s claim that the Singur land is good only for single-crop cultivation, or that it is wasteland, has also been shown to be false. Most of the land concerned is fertile multi-crop land, and the government’s claims on the matter seem to be based on land records that have not been updated for decades. Noted leftwing historian Sumit Sarkar recently affirmed, after a visit to Singur, that most of the government’s claims are indeed highly questionable: neither was the process of acquisition democratic and transparent, nor was the claim that the land was single-crop correct.

Outsiders, insiders
Singur was still creating a stir when a major eruption occurred in the Nandigram area of East Midnapore District. Here, in early January, the villagers were up in arms, as news reached them of an order by the Haldia Development Authority, under which Nandigram falls, identifying land for acquisition in the preparation of two new SEZs in the area. One of these is to be set up by the Salim Group, an Indonesian multinational corporation that was at the centre of much controversy last year, as Buddhadeb had committed it 5000 acres of land without consultation with other government functionaries. The drastic amendments he proposed to existing laws in order to facilitate these acquisitions, however, were rejected by a unanimous vote of the state assembly.

The two SEZs in the Haldia area will involve much more land than did the Tatas’ venture – somewhat over 14,500 acres to begin with. As the leaked news reached Nandigram, panic set in and preparations were made on a war footing for the possible arrival of police and paramilitary forces, to implement the land acquisition. The rage of the population fell on the local CPI(M) cadres, who had to flee for their lives. An angry crowd also set the local party office on fire and put up roadblocks in the approaches to the village. Sumit Sarkar’s report on Singur laments that the word cadre has become a term of abuse in local parlance. The party’s response to this outburst was to mobilise more ‘cadres’ from neighbouring areas and to launch a pre-meditated counterattack in which at least six people were killed.

In the course of its troubles in Singur and Nandigram, the CPI(M) leadership needed a scapegoat by means of which to discredit the struggle against its policies. They found this in the figure of the ‘outsider’, a representation that encompasses anyone who is not directly affected by the land acquisitions. The outsider could be Medha Patkar, the local Naxalite activist, students or intellectuals from Calcutta, or even local activists of parties such as the Trinamool Congress and the Socialist Unity Centre of India (SUCI). This is a strange argument for the communists to make, given that not one of their unions in any factory could have been set up without the active support of people from ‘outside’. But more to the point, might one be pardoned for asking, Are the Tatas and the Salim group of industries ‘insiders’? Is Buddha Babu, who committed other people’s land to these companies against the will of the owners, an insider?

Though there is an apparent calm for the time being, the West Bengal countryside is simmering, and much will depend on whether Mr Bhattacharya and the CPI(M) are prepared to rethink their strategy of rapid industrialisation. Agriculture in its present form might not be the best option, but if the rationale behind industrialisation is that it will create more jobs, it is clearly misplaced. Does Buddha Babu have any other strategy in mind, and will he act on it before irreversible damage is done?

Monday, June 9, 2008

Smash And Grab

http://www.tehelka.com/story_main36.asp?filename=Ne241107Smash_AndGrab.asp

What the CPM has unleashed is not a war for the control of Nandigram; it is waging a desperate and dirty battle for survival in its oldest fort. SHANTANU GUHA RAY reports

Sudeep Chaudhuri

IT’S A patch barely 250 square kilometres. It’s not big enough to contain a single Lok Sabha seat, it struggles to send six members to the 294-strong West Bengal Assembly. Not worth evoking desperate measures from a party that has been entrenched in power for more than three decades, you would think. Yet, over the last year, Nandigram has been a bloodied and mostly unsung battleground, locked in fullblown warfare launched by governmentbacked CPM apparatchik on the people. They went into it with an elaborate battle-plan, laying siege, scorching earth and taking pocket by pocket. They went into it with the most sophisticated weapons, AK-47s and landmines included. They were unafraid to kill and to destroy and to leave thousands destitute. They were adamant about keeping out the forces of State until the party had finished its work — until the CPM had made sure Nandigram had “fallen” the CRPF and local police remained in barracks.

The subservience of all things, including the State, to the will of the party is a classical Stalinist tenet; the CPM had just effected it in Nandigram, impervious to all protest, in violation of accepted principles of governance, in utter disregard of democracy. It is seldom that the Governor is outraged enough to speak out openly on public violations. Gopal Gandhi did, even pleading with grand old man Jyoti Basu against what the CPM was up to in Nandigram, but to little effect.

Finally, when Nandigram was “won” on November 12, the celebrations had a ring of military victory — columns of cadre in red bandannas drove in, the party flag was rampantly planted and local party offices jubilantly re-occupied.

This was a CPM stronghold that had all but fallen to the Bhumi Uchhed Pratirodh Committee (BUPC), an outfit that arose in opposition to Nandigram being declared an SEZ, but which slowly came to be backed by a cross-section of political and civil society groups. It had to be regained. The CPM did it ruthlessly. At Writer’s Building in Kolkata, the seat of government, Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya himself announced the end of the campaign, General-like. Asked about the violent smash and grab by his party in Nandigram, he retorted: “Well, it was a violent takeover by dangerous forces, they have now been paid back in the same coin.” Blunt. nabashed. Unapologetic. “We did not trigger violence. We faced it, resisted it for months and then, eventually countered it. As I said before, the Opposition and the BUPC have got a taste of their own medicine. There was tension, total chaos and lack of peace in Nandigram. We had to do something. Our supporters risked their lives and returned home and retaliated only in desperation,” he told TEHELKA minutes after his triumphal announcement.

In the process, though, Bhattacharya and his party had raised fundamental and disturbing questions: Is the will of a political party above all other interests? Is armed assault on 24 NOVEMBER 2007 TEHELKA the adversary permissible tactic? Are we to accept might as right? Is there an agency to prevent such sanction-driven lapse into mayhem? The CPM, after all, had left no one in doubt about the tactics it was employing to reclaim Nandigram — “maaro” was the cry of Politburo member Brinda Karat and the party was resonating it, in New Delhi and in West Bengal. Party boss Prakash Karat and Sitaram Yechury were offering grand articulations of the eye-for-eye violence, glossing over the ground rules of multi-party democracy. Local CPM bosses Biman Bose, Benoy Konar and Lakshman Seth (MP from Tamluk, which overlaps Nandigram) were exhorting cadre to pull no punches. The chief minister, his image as a literary sophisticate notwithstanding, was willing to submit his government to the intents and purposes of his party.

REPORTS THAT Bhattacharya has been “hounded by pangs of conscience” over what’s happened in Nandigram might do his image more than deserved credit. The fact is, whatever his personal opinion, his public face has been that of a man who sanctioned the brutality, at least did nothing to stop a bloody campaign by his own party when as chief minister he should have.

Photo:ABP

On the contrary, he and his party swung swiftly backstage to buffer their transgressions in Nandigram politically. A timely softening on the nuclear deal was widely interpreted as a means to neutralise both the Congress’ local belligerence and any intervention that New Delhi might have contemplated. And within the Left Front, dissent was effectively armtwisted. Consider the changed tone of senior RSP leader and state PWD minister Khiti Goswami. Days after he told a crowded press conference that he and two of his colleagues would resign from the Left Front government, Goswami did quite a U-turn; nobody was quitting, nobody was saying anything anymore about Nandigram or the CPM, at least not on the record. It is well-known that all Front partners including the CPI are deeply distressed at the CPM’s handling of Nandigram but they play under the compulsions of being junior, spanked partners. They can’t risk breaking rank.

But why did the CPM go so far in Nandigram? Why did it resort to Red Army Stalinism?

The answers are slowly coming to the fore. It was not about Nandigram, really, not about one Lok Sabha seat or half a dozen in the Assembly. It was all about the realm. You lose a bastion like Nandigram and you could start a cascade of similar revolts, it could be the beginning of the end. At the party headquarters in Alimuddin Street in the heart of Kolkata, CPM leaders offer no end of explanations for Operation Nandigram, including that it was becoming a hub of Naxalites. But the real lie within the CPM itself — it fears that one loss could trigger a series, that once the myth of its invincibility is exploded, other areas would follow the Nandigram example. Nandagopal Bhattacharya, top CPI leader and West Bengal minister, agrees: “As a ruling party, it is important for the Left Front to look into the ground realities in Nandigram. We cannot let a stronghold slip away and let the Opposition rule. We currently hold all the four parliamentary seats in the (Midnapore) region and a significant number of Assembly seats. We need to improve, not lose out.”

In fact, his voice echoes with sentiments expressed by a staunch opponent. Basudev Bose, the state secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), accused of fermenting trouble in Nandigram along with Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress, says the end of violence in Midnapore district now revealed the true reason of the Left Front’s panic. “Nandigram should have been silent ever since Bhattacharya announced that there will be no chemical hub there. In fact, not many know the previous efforts to industrialise also met with disaster in the region when the state government — way back in the 90s — pushed a jelling ham project over 250 acres of land. But that the region was not silent is evident from the fact that those fighting in the area are doing it for political control, for the May 2008 panchayat elections in West Bengal.”

Bose calls the Nandigram experience a desperate attempt by the Left Front to maintain its stronghold over the countryside. “But there were cracks in the Red Wall of Bengal that guarded the countryside and the CPM realised there’s trouble brewing in a number of areas.” There’s already been waves of anti-CPM ferment in the urban middle class following Rizwanur Rahman’s dubious murder; intimations of losing ground in the rural heartland must make party bosses nervous. Political analysts agree. Noted writer
Samaresh Mazumdar feels the kinds of discontent opposition parties are generating in rural Bengal are not simple pushovers. In many places, these forces have gained more than a toehold. “Frankly, Mamata Banerjee has got a new lease of life in her fledgling political career because of Nandigram, a region where TMC has never been a dominant factor except a few seats here and there. And that it was suddenly pushing an agenda was clear to the Left Front though those outside Bengal felt BUPC was fighting for its land from industrial sharks. In fact, there are no land sharks in that region.”

Nor is it such a Maoist stronghold as the CPM claims. Buddhadeb Bhattacharya claimed Nandigram acquired a volatile overtone after state intelligence confirmed the presence of a group of Maoists under the leadership of one Ranjit Pal from Jharkhand who had set up a training camp and was smuggling firearms. It was obvious that the chief minister was oblivious to comments made to the contrary by state Home Secretary Prasad Ranjan Roy; 24 hours before the chief minister spoke, Roy had told reporters that despite the Communists’ claims of Maoist presence in Nandigram, no rebel was found in the region. The CRPF did confirm the recovery of one landmine and a 3.3 rifle from BUPC stronghold Sonachura. But opinion about Nandigram becoming a Maoist stronghold was met with scepticism. Noted Bengali litterateur Suchitra Bhattacharya said: “Who knows who planted it to give the entire operation a different colour. It’s almost like George Bush’s excuse to attack Iraq despite not
finding any chemical weapons.”

The Opposition is beginning on the “desperate CPM” theme too. Hours after the siege was broken through gunfire, BJP leader LK Advani — on a visit to Nandigram — old villagers outside the Tamluk hospital that there was more at stake for the Left Front government in West Bengal than just settling scores with a gang of farmers backed by the Trinamool. “The way the party moved in total cohesion to take charge of Nandigram confirms my belief. So does my belief that the silence from the Congress is because it has the nuclear deal in mind and needs the Left’s support to seal it. Obviously, the party will not react on Nandigram.” Agrees Trinamool chief Mamata Banerjee, describing the Centre’s silence on Nandigram as its gift to the CPM for softening its stand on the nuclear deal. “I am aware of the Centre’s compulsions. Till 12 days ago, the Centre — despite repeated requests for CRPF and intervention — did not react and allowed the massacre to happen. But the good sign is that many Left intellectuals and members of the Bengali intelligentsia are waking up to the realities of CPM misrule,” she told her supporters in Tamluk, where she was camping on being denied entry to Nandigram.

BANERJEE SHOULD know. The city’s intelligentsia, despite a brutal cane charge by the police, assembled in the heart of Kolkata on November 14 and observed a silent protest. Veteran actor Soumitra Chatterjee, who sided with the Left Front and asked those protesting why they did not raise their voice when BUPC members attacked CPM cadre, found himself increasingly isolated. “Sorry Soumitra, do not make such stupid remarks. You must know what you are saying. No one visited your
film festival [Chatterjee is the chairperson of the film fest currently on in the city] and everyone is sad at your pro-Nandigram remarks. I do not know what you will do but I will side with those who lost their family members, those who lost their homes and those who lost their livelihood,” wrote veteran footballer Surajit Dasgupta in a
pro-Left vernacular daily.

But now that the guns have fallen silent will the Trinamool sing a different tune? Party functionaries reject any such idea, claiming the second phase of Nandigram will soon be announced and that there would be no let up. “Mamata doesn’t want to dilute her agitation on the Nandigram issue. We will continue to highlight an important issue like Nandigram,” Partha Chatterjee, leader of the Opposition in the Assembly, told TEHELKA.

What’s in store for the ruling party? If there is anything Bhattacharya needs to be worried about after the Nandigram pogrom, it is this increasing isolation, especially from those who — despite not being in the party — stood with him for the last four decades on almost all issues, barring Singur and, of course, Nandigram. And if this feeling spreads among he people, both inside and outside Kolkata, the man who was once considered a thinking chief minister, will have to do some serious introspection. Presently, he is busy collecting his armour. The next battle is due in the panchayat elections in May 2008. Bhattacharya needs to win it — to retain the grip on his seat, party and power.

From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 4, Issue 45, Dated Nov 24, 2007

Violence on the Left: Nandigram and the Communists of West Bengal

http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1157


A
FTER A PERIOD of relative impotence, the Hindu-supremacist right in India has rebounded, with the December reelection of Bharatiya Janata Party candidate Narendra Modi as chief minister in Gujarat. Modi’s role in the mass murders of Muslims in that state in February 2002 has long been so well documented that he has been denied a visa to enter the United States. Recently, moreover, extensive corroboration of his role was elicited by a hidden-camera inquiry conducted by the news-magazine Tehelka. Despite overwhelming evidence that he is a mass murderer extraordinaire—or perhaps, because of it—Modi defied media predictions, and even exit polls, to win by a landslide, a victory in which fund-raising and politicking by Indians residing in the United States (40 percent of Indian Americans are Gujarati) played a large role. Because the rival Congress Party, which controls the central government in a coalition, understands well the intense hatred of Muslims that animates many Gujarati Hindus, leading politicians tiptoed around the issue of sectarian violence, hoping to defeat the BJP in Gujarat on its weak economic record. Only Sonia Gandhi, courageously and repeatedly, denounced Modi’s reign of blood. (American Gujaratis responded with an e-mail campaign denouncing Gandhi in abusive language.) Hitler is revered as a hero in school textbooks in Gujarat. In Modi, those who worship at that shrine seem to have found the type of leader they seek. Let’s hope that the nation as a whole does not embrace his charismatic call to hate.

Meanwhile, however, violence has been in the news from a very different part of the Indian political spectrum. People connected to the Communist government of West Bengal have been guilty of some extremely vile actions, including rape and murder, toward dissident peasants, in a struggle over land acquisition, and the government has done nothing to prevent these terrible things. This struggle has split the Indian left, between those who think that people on the left must maintain solidarity in the face of right-wing threats and those who insist on calling murder murder no matter who does it. It’s a conflict from which we can learn a lot, not only about Indian politics but also about what stance a contemporary left movement can reasonably and morally take on rural development issues.

West Bengal’s Communist Regime
Communist parties played a significant role after independence in two Indian states, West Bengal and Kerala, but they rose to power only in the late 1960s. The Communist Party of India split in 1964 over the Sino-Indian War. The party currently dominant in West Bengal, known as the CPI(M) (Communist Party of India, Marxist) backed China and initially opposed democratic nationalism. Nonetheless, despite grumbling about “bourgeois democracy,” the party gradually came to accept a nation-friendly parliamentary role, espousing democracy, if with less than wholehearted enthusiasm. Significantly, Stalinism was never formally repudiated. Economist Amartya Sen tells of explaining to his daughter, around 1975, who that mustached man was on the huge posters in Howrah station, Kolkata: “Look at him carefully, Indrani, since you will not see his picture anywhere else in the world any more.” In 1977 the CPI(M) gained a majority in West Bengal, and it has ruled ever since. Jyoti Basu served as chief minister from 1977 until his retirement in 2000, when he was succeeded by the current chief minister, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee.

Although land reform was approved by West Bengal’s precommunist government, it was implemented under the communists, and West Bengal and Kerala remain the only two Indian states that have had successful land reform. There is wide agreement on both left and right that reform of these states’ quasi-feudal system of land tenure was essential not only to social equity but also to economic development. In other respects, however, the situation of the rural poor has not prospered under communist leadership. The great power of labor unions has caused a loss of employment in both West Bengal and Kerala, as industry seeks more friendly climates in neighboring states.

ON THE CRUCIAL issues of health and education, Kerala’s Communists have performed far better than those in West Bengal, making the state, in some respects, a model of successful state-led development. Kerala provides universal health care and has achieved universal literacy among adolescents, through an aggressive and well-managed program of public education that includes the clever idea (pioneered in neighboring Tamil Nadu) of a nutritious midday meal, as a carrot to lead parents of working children to allow them to go to school. The Supreme Court of India has now said that all states must offer this meal, even specifying the number of calories it must contain (at least three hundred) and the number of grams of protein (eight to twelve). West Bengal, by contrast, has shown little creativity in either health or education. Infant mortality, it is true, is lower than in most Indian states, but distinctly higher than in Kerala. Maternal mortality figures are distressingly high, and a major cause is lack of access to decent health care in the rural areas. (A recent UNICEF report documents the alarming frequency with which women giving birth die because they simply cannot reach a hospital in time.)

In education, the Pratichi Trust (established by Sen with his Nobel Prize money) has found that the education of the rural poor is in a very bad way, owing to lack of facilities, teacher absenteeism (around 20 percent), and the disgraceful practice of “private tuition” (teaching for money in rich pupils’ homes after school, which gives incentives to teachers not to teach in school, a practice protected by the corrupt teachers’ union). So, the record of the CPI(M) is mixed at best. One might also mention the CPI(M)’s neglect of the once-superb university system: Kolkata was the intellectual capital of the nation, and is no longer.

Rural self-government through the panchayat system exists in West Bengal, and, indeed, the state took a leading role in pioneering that system. It would be wrong to think that the Communists are distinctive in their support for this system, which now exists throughout the nation, has enjoyed constitutional protection since 1992, and has different, Gandhian roots. Although some panchayats operate well, what too often characterizes the panchayat system in West Bengal is the dictatorial way it operates: one hears of CPI(M) officials marching illiterate voters to the polls en masse: “turning out the vote” has an all too literal meaning. Nor could one reasonably say that communism has made much progress in eradicating class and caste in government. Indeed, as those familiar with Bengali nomenclature can recognize from names alone, the ruling elites are all firmly upper-caste Hindu, from elite backgrounds. This is true in all the major political parties, but one might have hoped it would have been less true in the CPI(M). (Muslims in West Bengal, as in most other Indian states, are disproportionately poor and ill-educated.)

In Jyoti Basu, the CPI(M) had one of India’s most savvy politicians. Whatever his failures on health and education, Basu combined a deep commitment to social equality with a canny awareness of the ways in which communism, to work for people, must be tempered by economic realism. He argued that communism’s fundamental commitment was to human welfare, and that in the present-day world, Bengal could achieve this only by allying itself, for certain purposes, with capitalist investment. For some time, the state has sought to attract both domestic and foreign capital, trying to convince industrialists that doing business in the state needn’t make them hostage to endless labor difficulties. Basu was (and still is, at the age of ninety-three) a consummate persuader and a pragmatist, and he had, and has, a superb ability to convince people to depart from ideology for the sake of a perceived common good. One of the state’s current problems is that Bhattacharjee is a much less able man, a dogmatic, unmoving hedgehog to Basu’s wily fox.

The heart of the state’s current problems is the condition of rural agriculture. Although the state has done much to enhance the quality of rural agriculture, it cannot remain as heavily dependent upon agriculture as it has been, although there are those on the left who romanticize agriculture and resist industrialization as an evil. (This, too, was a Gandhian tradition.) If jobs are to be generated and incomes raised, industrial development is necessary. Effecting this shift will mean devoting less land to agriculture. The rural poor, however, are not eager to give up their land and their way of life. Why should they? The government that wants to effect such a transition peacefully will need to do more than offer fair value for land: it will need a long-term, well-established program of educational development and skills training, so that the people who are thrown off the land have employment opportunities in the firms that will open on that land. It does no good to tell people that industrialization creates jobs, if these are jobs that they themselves can’t possibly fill. The Bhattacharjee government appears not to understand any of this; it seems to think that when it decides on an industrial strategy, everyone should simply go along.

UNFORTUNATELY for public debate, the CPI(M) has no credible opposition. The primary opposition party, the so-called “Trinamool Congress” headed by the theatrical self-promoter Mamata Banerjee (a Brahmin from a poor urban family, who poses one minute as the ally of the downtrodden and, the next, as the best friend of upper-caste large landowners) has no coherent development policy and has also allied itself opportunistically with the Hindu right, forming part of the coalition government that held power nationally before 2004. People committed to social equity stay with the CPI(M) because they have no alternative, and the government knows that. The CPI(M)’s key role in sustaining the Congress Party at the national level in the current coalition government adds to its arrogance.

Singur and Nandigram
The first sign of trouble for the CPI(M)’s industrialization strategy came last year, when the government announced a deal to set up a Tata Group car plant in an agricultural area near Kolkata. Although the government claims (controversially) that it offered fair market value for the necessary land, the local inhabitants protested vigorously. The government’s basic idea, though contested by those who unduly romanticize agriculture, has won wide support from development thinkers (including Sen, for example), particularly in light of the fact that the Tata Group, an India-based corporation, has a record of sensitivity and decency on employment issues. The protests, moreover, were clearly staged by Mamata Banerjee to at least some extent, in a grab for personal power after a bad electoral defeat. Singur’s population is not overwhelmingly dependent on agriculture. Still, there were ominous signs for the future, such as the government’s lack of attention to transitional skills training and to public debate. Many people wondered why the government had selected this fertile tract of land for industrial development, rather than nonarable land closer to the city; the government refused to answer such questions.

In addition, last year, a strange example of the government’s arrogance came to light in its handling of a tragic case of either murder or suicide. A young Muslim computer scientist, Rizwanur Rehman, married the daughter of a wealthy Hindu industrialist, Ashok Todi. Her family tried everything to break them up. The couple several times asked for police protection, in vain. Finally, the husband was found dead on a railroad track. The same (government-controlled) police, evidently eager to cozy up to capital by preventing any serious inquiry into the behavior of the Todis, quickly ruled the case a suicide without even a cursory investigation, although there was a good deal of evidence against such a conclusion. The government then defended the bad behavior of the police. Finally, after a public outcry, the CBI (India’s FBI) came in to do a real investigation, which continues.

Now to Nandigram. In 2006, the government announced plans to build a chemical plant in that district, west of Kolkata. The firm operating it was to be an Indonesia-based firm that lacked the good labor record of the Tatas. As in the case of Singur, there was little consultation and no program of skills training and employment transition. The resistance of local people (considerably poorer and more dependent on agriculture than the people of Singur) was both genuine and fierce, although no doubt Mamata Banerjee encouraged it. In February 2007, the government announced that it had abandoned the plan, but people didn’t believe it. Fears of dislocation and dispossession led peasants to form a group (very likely aided by Mamata) that seized control of several villages in the area, driving out by force the CPI(M) supporters who lived there.

On March 14, 2007, the government went in to seize control of these villages. Its pretext was that Maoist rebels belonging to a Naxalite terrorist group were training there and had smuggled in firearms. No credible evidence supported this assertion, as even government home secretary Prasad Ranjan Roy said, departing from the orthodox Party line. Police went in to take control, but it is also clear that many of the armed men were from CPI(M) Party cadres, a kind of private Party-led army and not the official forces of law and order. Shots were fired, mostly (it appears) by these cadres. Around fourteen civilians, including women and children, were killed and seventy wounded. The government’s official story is that armed Maoist terrorists were organizing the villagers and had put women and children up front, while firing on the government’s men from behind them. This story is not credible, in light of the fact that many people were shot in the back. No less a figure than Jyoti Basu himself reproved the government for its authoritarian strategy, saying, “Is this the way the Left Front government should function? I have been told that the mob went violent but on the contrary I saw men with bullets in their back on TV. Why is it so?”

Although the government tried to prevent journalists and other observers from entering the area and questioning victims, some were able to get in. Historian Tanika Sarkar tells me that she personally saw marks of sexual assault on the bodies of young women and girls, and, at the local government-run hospital, saw scores of desperately injured people whom officials had ordered discharged, although they could not stand or walk. A doctor who refused to sign discharge papers had been transferred.

As the months went on, things got worse. Although the CPI(M) tried to keep journalists out of the area, there is much evidence by now that armed Party cadres patrolled the villages, engaging in rape, assault, and murder. Opposition villagers were forcibly evicted from their homes, and many remain in temporary camps today, still vulnerable to violence. (Much of this is extensively documented in the report of an investigative People’s Commission published last summer.) In the late fall, things heated up, and numerous clashes were reported, again with Party cadres, not the official police, playing the aggressive role. The state’s high court ordered normalcy restored and refused to hear the government’s objections to the involvement of national forces (both police and investigators) in restoring law and order. Left Front chair Biman Bose scoffed at the court, calling its judgment “unconstitutional”—and was cited for criminal contempt. By now, the nation’s Supreme Court has agreed to review the matter on both sides, at the same time chiding the CPI(M) for wasting people’s time with litigation rather than doing something constructive for the people of Nandigram. By November, violence escalated, again with Party cadres, not officers of the law, taking the aggressive role. Indeed, the police were withdrawn, and the chief minister openly handed the area over to the cadres, stating that he was not just a chief minister, but also a Party person. Graves from these assaults are still being discovered by the central police force. It is alleged that government-controlled hospitals were reluctant to help the victims. Chief Minister Bhattacharjee defended the use of force, saying that the villagers had been “paid back in their own coin.”

Critics and the Left Split
Enter the governor. A governor, in an Indian state, is a basically ceremonial officer, usually nonpartisan. West Bengal’s current governor is Gopal Krishna Gandhi, the youngest grandson of the Mahatma, a man of delicacy, grace, and sympathy. A strict vegetarian and supporter of animal rights, he has a passionate interest in bird-watching. One might have thought this peaceful, cultivated man hardly a match for the thuggish party leaders of the CPI(M). One would have been wrong. Taking a degree of initiative unusual for a governor, he issued a lengthy public statement. Nandigram, he said, had become “a war zone,” and “No government or society can allow a war zone to exist without immediate and effective action.” The treatment of villagers “was against all norms of civilized political behavior.” He urged peace talks, a call in which he was joined by Jyoti Basu. He ended by saying, “Enough is enough. Peace and security should be restored, without any delay, from where they have been evicted from Nandigram.”

CPI(M) officials don’t like to be criticized, and they truculently denounced Gandhi’s speech. The state secretary, Biman Bose, said that Gandhi was “overstepping the constitutional limits of his office. . . .[S]ome of his predecessors had to depart without completing their tenure.” India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, however, backed up Gandhi on November 20, asking the state government to restore law and order. “It is the duty of the State Government that all sections regardless of their political affiliations get protection of the law enforcement agencies. I understand the spontaneous outpouring of grief and anguish over the issue as expressed by the artists and intellectuals in Kolkata.”

Singh was alluding to the public protest against the government’s violence in Nandigram led by leading Bengali artists and writers. West Bengal has always cared about intellectuals. It has the largest book fair in the world and a proud tradition of achievement in arts and letters, in religious, philosophical, and economic thought. (Sen’s Nobel Prize was occasion for a parade of approximately a million people in Kolkata in 1998, something difficult to imagine in New York or Chicago.) So it was no mere gesture when, shortly after the March 14 incident, leading historians Tanika Sarkar and Sumit Sarkar (joining other artists and activists who had begun protesting earlier) returned major literary awards that they had won from the government, saying that what had happened in Nandigram was even more shocking than the infamous British massacre of innocent civilians at Jallianwala Bagh in 1919, more shocking because one would not expect better behavior from the British, but one would from this left-wing government. “We are shattered,” said Tanika Sarkar. “All this has happened and there is not a word of shame or apology from the CPI(M) central committee or state committee.” By November, many more had joined the Sarkars. Leading members of the film industry boycotted the state’s film festival, and on November 14—the occasion to which Singh was alluding directly, a group of artists and writers, including filmmaker Aparna Sen and writer Mahasweta Devi, held a protest against the government in downtown Kolkata. Some claimed that the violence in Nandigram was comparable to the use of violence against Muslims by social groups allied with the BJP in Gujarat in 2002.

THE CPI(M) government contains many decent people, dedicated to social welfare and equality. Among these, I am convinced, is Jasodhara Bagchi, chair of the West Bengal Women’s Commission, who has done a good deal to bring relief to women injured or raped in the violence. (Although she is accused of inaction in the People’s Commission report, and has been much criticized by protesting artists and writers for alleged inaction, the statements don’t seem to me correct: on March 28, she issued a very strong statement of protest against the March 14 violence, calling it a “shameful event,” and demanding both a thorough inquiry and compensation for the victims.) Similarly, the Institute of Development Studies Kolkata (IDSK), a government-funded think tank chaired by Bagchi’s husband, Amiya, a noted economist, has done a good deal of valuable intellectual work pertinent to the state’s economic crisis, including work on industrialization and agriculture. (I must divulge that these two people are personal friends—as are the Sarkars on the other side—and that I am an honorary professor at IDSK, though with no remuneration.) It is perhaps not surprising that people who can do good work within the government, despite its flaws, would be reluctant to denounce it publicly, and I do not condemn their failure to do so, particularly in light of the extremely low quality and the fascist ties of the opposition. Nonetheless, one who stands on and looks at these events as an outsider must conclude that the government’s actions are vile and utterly unacceptable.

It is this issue that has split India’s left. The artists and intellectuals I’ve named are in a few cases motivated by a woolly romanticism about agriculture and an ideological opposition to all industrial development. For this they should be criticized. Some of them may also have had unrealistic expectations for this government, whose Stalinists roots they have perhaps insufficiently appreciated. For this lack of caution they should also be criticized. They also, however, have had the courage of consistent moral principle, standing up against brutality even when the perpetrators are friends. For this they are to be greatly admired. Not so admirable, by contrast, have been the statements of some leftists to the effect that one should not criticize one’s friends, that solidarity is more important than ethical correctness. One may or may not trace this line to an old Marxist contempt for bourgeois ethics, but it is loathsome whatever its provenance.

A particularly fatuous document of this kind was a letter authored by Noam Chomsky, signed by a number of Indian American intellectuals who should know better, and published in the Hindu, a leading national India newspaper, on November 22, 2007. Besides lauding the CPI(M) for “important experiments” for which it deserves no particular credit (such as “local self-government”), the letter reasons that people on the left ought to focus on opposition to the actions of the United States in Iraq, rather than fighting with one another. “This is not the time for division when the basis of division no longer appears to exist,” concludes Chomsky, having asserted, entirely without cause on that date, that things are basically back to normal and that the two sides have reconciled. This is the type of left politics that holds that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, no matter how many rapes and murders that friend has actually perpetrated.

HERE WE ARRIVE at an issue that lies at the heart of all the leftist political movements of the twentieth century: is solidarity itself a major political value or is the basic value that of justice to each and every person, treating each and every one as an end? The latter vision is that of left-liberalism, which has always held that the purpose of a politics of human welfare is to improve the lives of individual human beings, and that each human being counts as equally worthy of respect. By contrast, “solidarity,” both on the communitarian right and on the antiliberal left, has suggested to many that the lives of individuals may and often must be sacrificed in the pursuit of class or group goals, and that worries about the justice of such sacrifices are irritatingly bourgeois. That’s really what the split in India is about, and it corresponds to a split between the Nehruvian/Gandhian founding of the nation and its long-standing communist tradition. Nehru and Gandhi knew that people come first and that each and every person is precious. Gandhi had an extremely rare ability to feel and express compassion not for “the masses” or “the proletariat,” but for each person who suffered. (He said that his goal was to “wipe every tear from every eye,” thus reminding his audience that suffering and death are uncompromisingly personal. Classes may be useful analytical categories, but it is individual people who weep.) In consequence, Gandhi eschewed violence against persons as a political tool, and he showed vividly what it was to treat the human body as a mere means, and what it was to treat it as an end. This politics of personhood survives in West Bengal, in the stance of Gopal Gandhi; in the protests of many artists and writers; and, also, in the courageous work of many individual members of the CPI(M). It appears to have been forgotten (if it was ever accepted) by the government’s central leadership.

In assessing the specific situation of West Bengal, we must distinguish between the government’s industrial strategy, which I, like Amartya Sen, believe to be generally correct and the means the government chose to implement it, which are appalling. First, one should condemn the utter lack of provision for job transitions, made worse by more general failures in educational development. Second (the focus of Sen’s recent critique) one should condemn the government’s lack of interest in public debate and public discussion, to which one can now add condemnation of the rude and truculent treatment of reasonable opposition, such as that of the governor. Third, one must strongly condemn the government’s reliance on unofficial “private army” cadres. The rule of law requires that enforcement be carried out by the agents of the law. The private armies of Nandigram are in that sense no better than the private armies of the Hindu right. Fourth, one must condemn the government’s cavalier way with truth and evidence, as in the unsubstantiated allegations about Maoist activity in the area. Finally, and most strongly, one must utterly condemn the (apparently continuing, at least until very recently) acts of rape, murder, and assault against villagers, mostly by these “private armies.”

What led to this breakdown in governance? The seeds of catastrophe lie, no doubt, in the never-sufficiently-de-Stalinized background of this Party, always suspicious of democracy, always used to treating people as agents of class struggle rather than as individual human beings who need specific life prospects if they are to give up their land. This general orientation toward human beings led to a lack of appreciation that an industrial strategy, even if basically correct, needs to focus on what real people are able to do and to be, rather than thinking only in statistical terms. Under Jyoti Basu the party would never have erred in this way, so one must also impute the disaster to inferior, insecure leadership, fearful of genuine debate and transparency. The arrogance of long electoral success contributed further to turn this insecurity into an aggressive strategy for total control of the rural areas.

Is the comparison to the events of Gujarat, frequently heard on the right, but sometimes also on the left, illuminating? Not very, I believe. The murders of Muslims in Gujarat were part of a concerted antiminority strategy fueled by ethnic hatred. I have argued in these pages and elsewhere that the pogrom deserved to be called a genocide (“Genocide in Gujarat: The International Community Looks Away,” Summer 2003). People were killed simply because they were Muslims. The killings in Nandigram are examples of hideous lawlessness, and a determination to wipe out opposition, but there seems to be no ethnic or genocidal component to them. Sarkar’s comparison to Jallianwala Bagh (where the British, bent on total control, opened fire on peaceful demonstrators) is far more apt, and we might indeed see Bhattacharjee as a first cousin of General Reginald Dyer, unable to accept the reality of a human being who disagrees with him.

On December 26, 2007, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee went out to Nandigram and issued a public apology. He spoke with regret of the need to win people’s hearts, and he again assured the local residents that the plan for the chemical plant had been scrapped. Has this group learned its lesson? One would hope that the wise public counsel of the governor—and, one imagines, the behind-the-scenes counsel of many others—have convinced the CPI(M) that “bourgeois democracy” requires listening, together with a focus on educational development. If that turns out to be the case, well and good. If the government returns to its arrogant ways, however, it will continue to need and deserve the criticism of fellow egalitarians, who must not allow solidarity to trump justice.


Martha C. Nussbaum is Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, appointed in the Philosophy Department, Law School, and Divinity School. She is an Affiliate of the Committee on Southern Asian Studies and a board member of the Human Rights Program. Among the pieces consulted for this article are an issue of Tehelka called “Why Nandigram?” November 24, 2007; Nandigram: What Really Happened?, the report of the People’s Tribunal, published in Delhi by Daanish Books in December 2007; an excellent two-part article by Amartya Sen, “The Industrial Strategy: Developments in West Bengal,” the Telegraph (Kolkata), December 29 and 30, 2007; and Malini Bhattacharya, “Nandigram and the Question of Development,” Economic and Political Weekly, May 26, 2007.

Sunday, May 18, 2008

Red terror in Nandigram

by Sunanda Sanyal

Two rounds of the panchayat elections in West Bengal are over but post-election violence continues. During the second round on 14 March, eight people were killed in cold blood. The murder at Basanti, an RSP stronghold, both on election day and the day after, shows the CPI-M is going to brook no opposition. It will use the police and its goons in dealing with its own allies as remorselessly as it flouts democratic institutions. It has slandered the Governor, the sole human face in the government, the Calcutta High Court and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), for example. For lesser mortals, ‘political correctness’ is engendered by the fear of murder and rape. The time for the bhadralok to play the innocent bystander is running out.
It is in this context that the findings of the NHRC assume the finality of the statement that, with the CPI-M government in place, the party’s murder and rape squads shall rule the state henceforth. Unlike the state human rights commission, known for its servility, the NHRC is respected all over India. Its chairman, former Supreme Court Chief Justice S Rajendra Babu, has described the violence at Nandigram as the “worst scars on the face of the nation”. Mr Sitaram Yechury, Mr Basudeb Acharia, Ms Brinda Karat, Mr Mohammad Salim (CPI-M MPs), Mr D Raja and Mr Gurudas Dasgupta (both CPI) have given Mr Babu a protest note. The RSP and Forward Bloc have, however, disagreed. They have begun to pay. Some the details of the NHRC’s findings are, therefore, worth a look.
The NHRC conducted an investigation at Nandigram from 15 November to 20 November 2007. It identified three phases in the Nandigram movement. The first (3 January to 14 March) is marked by police inaction despite regular clashes between the CPI-M and Bhumi Uchchhed Pratirodh Committee (BUPC). The second (15 March to 30 September 2007) is the aftermath of 14 March, dealt with on the basis of documentary evidence received from Ms Medha Patkar of the Narmada Bachao Andolan, People’s Tribunal on Nandigram and Citizen’s Solidarity among others. The third phase, events thereafter, confirms our worst fears of state terrorism under a chief minister who calls rapists and killers at Nandigram “us”, while all else are “them”.
Once the government had announced its decision to acquire land for a special economic zone, the political character of Nandigram changed with a large number of CPI-M cadres switching loyalty. The Trinamul Congress (TMC), which headed the BUPC, was the major gainer. To begin with, police tried to prevent clashes between BUPC and CPI-M goons, but stopped intervening when intervention was necessary. Eventually, the villagers “completely lost faith in the police”. They feared the police would help the CPI-M regain control of Nandigram and locals would lose their land. Notably, the commission found no evidence of Maoists aiding the BUPC. CPI-M supporters may have fled in fear from areas dominated by the BUPC, but the cadres never complained to the police of “impending attacks” by Maoists.
Wherever police registered FIRs against the BUPC, the latter’s supporters suffered heavily. Conversely, there is substance in their complaint of police failure in protecting them against CPI-M violence. For example, the police received information on 4 November that the CPI-M was planning to enter Gokulnagar on 6 November from Khejuri. Police withdrew before the plan was implemented. Once the police was withdrawn, the cadres safely cross-ed the Tekhali bridge. In fact, the police were so completely emasculated that the NHRC team found a “CPI-M flag atop the police bunker at the Tekhali bridge”. No one dared pull it down even after a week. Police wouldn’t record FIRs, doing so only when the NHRC intervened.
The officer-in-charge of Nandigram police station refused to record FIRs unless they were endorsed by a “local CPI-M leader”. General diary entries, the wireless transcript log books (both of Nandigram police station and the district control room) and the FIR register tell another sordid tale. They bristle with “manipulations and insertions, blank columns and pages, exaggerated FIRs, and sloppy investigations”. All these prove the police force’s subservience. The NHRC report drives you inexorably to the conclusion that, with this government in place, the rule of law is impossible.
Take these examples, as recorded by the NHRC. The Nandigram police station’s control room logbook for 10 November was left blank, “at the in-stance of one of the senior officers”. It was as if the day was uneventful, although it witnessed a gruesome assault by the CPI-M cadres on a peaceful BUPC procession. Many BUPC supporters were injured, some died.
Moreover, the CPI-M cadres forcibly herded around 400 of these people, from where the police subsequently ‘rescued’ 11 people (according to the statement of the officer-in-charge, Nandigram police station and circle inspector, Mahisabad). However, none of these events figures in the general diary or wireless transcripts.
The NHRC goes on to give a number of examples of rape victims being dismissed without forensic examination. Take Akhreja Bibi, who was allegedly raped by CPI-M cadres. She suffered severe pain and had a swelling on the upper thigh and on the pelvis. Several other symptoms too indicated rape. But the doctor did not examine her, because she was a “mother after all”. Actually, the NHRC report gives you the impression that West Bengal police will never be fair with the CPI-M in power. They do not have “courage to take action against CPI-M cadres”. You need the “local CPI-M leader…to get any work done by the police”.
Even a week after the vandalism, the district administration did not care to survey the extent of damage to houses. CPI-M cadres claimed to be the owners of the houses that BUPC supporters had left behind. So chances were that the little relief that they provided did not reach the right hands.
More shocking, government doctors acted neither professionally nor fairly. In most cases, injuries were “recorded on small pieces of paper and handed over to the patient” rather than being entered into a medico-legal register.
The NHRC’s interactions with Mr Alok Raj, deputy inspector-general, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which made a perceptible difference at Nandigram, are revealing. The central force arrived after its recapture. The CPI-M’s motorcycle brigade had already taken over the village, “creating terror in the minds of BUPC supporters”, with the cadres “thrashing, beating and imposing fines” on BUPC workers. Mr Raj informed the commission that the state government wanted the CRPF to leave the actual trouble spot, i.e. the CPI-M-dominated areas, and move to TMC-dominated areas. The intention was to “weaken the TMC’s hold”. Mr Raj refused.

(Note: All quotations have been taken from the NHRC report.)

(The writer is former Head of the Department, English, Belur
Ramakrishna Mission College)



See also: http://development-dialogues.blogspot.com/2008/05/nhrc-sends-12-point-recommendation-to-w.html