Sunday, May 19, 2013
Let's tackle inequality head on for development after the MDGs
Posted by Madhura at 9:10 AM 3 comments
Labels: Articles, Inequality, Millenium Development Goals, Poverty
Friday, January 14, 2011
Aid, India and Peanuts
http://www.globaldashboard.org/2011/01/06/aid-india-and-peanuts/#more-16191
Andy Sumner
The UK parliament’s development committee begins its inquiry into UK aid to India next week with a question mark over the future of UK aid to a country where there are 450 million poor people – a third of the world’s poor -living below US$1.25/day. In fact, 8 Indian states alone have more poor people than the 26 poorest African countries combined.
This is emotional territory – on both the UK and India side – during Cameron’s autumn 2010 visit sparks flew with the Indian finance minister calling UK aid ($700m) ‘peanuts’ in an angry response to the suggestion that the UK might end aid to India.
An Indian official’s memo leaked to the BBC largely concurred with the ‘who do you guys think you are?’ line.
It might be that the Indians got mad because DFID signaled it wanted to direct more aid to individual states rather than the central government. More recently the idea of an emerging power, that is a foreign aid donor itself, accepting aid has raised substantial debate within India itself.
DFID’s Secretary of State, Andrew Mitchell is said to be open to discussion either way but was persuaded so far by Cameron that the UK can’t be seen to be cutting aid to a country that British people think is a poor country even if it isn’t.
Donors have a somewhat tangled logic on middle income countries (MICs):
1. The mission of donors is poverty reduction
2. 72% of the poor live in MICs
3. Donors are withdrawing from MICs, where the poor live
4. Oops…
Currently, India receives about $2bn of aid/year from donors and the UK makes up about a third of this. Since 1998, India has received more UK overseas aid than any other country. Further DFID works in 27 MICs and spends about a third of bilateral programming in MICs in 2008/9. In contrast, almost a half of EU ODA is to MICS.
The paradox is India, like many other countries was ‘graduated’ out of ‘poor country’ status by the World Bank in 2009 to middle income status (more than $1000 per person per year) but is still home to a third of the world’s poor or 450 million people. India is still IDA (World Bank) eligible but will likely graduate three years from now.
Of course this is a good news story of India getting richer but with an underside. Recent research suggests the level of inequality in India is at ‘Latin American type levels’ but the capacity for redistribution by taxation is limited as it would mean prohibitively high levels of taxation.
So sound like these’s still a case for UK aid?
The debate on UK aid to India is polarised but clear enough -
The case against UK aid to India is based on the large resources of the central government in India and that UK aid is small compared to: $300bn forex reserves; the Indian space programme and nuclear programme and India’s own aid programme estimated at at least $550m+.
Of course Pakistan also has a nuclear programme but no one in the suggesting cutting aid to Pakistan that is also now a middle income country and home to perhaps up 90 million poor people…
The case for continued UK aid to India is those 450 million poor people, most of whom live in India’s poor states in a decentralised system where some Indian states have been compared to fragile states in Africa. Also the poor in India are lower caste, tribes, etc and so very marginalised – not just a bit poor but very poor. Which makes reducing poverty much harder due to entrenched marginalization.
UK aid currently focuses on national-led level poverty programmes and 4 ‘focus states’ – Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Of course only one of these is on the BIMARU (in hindi, sick) states group that are often thought to be the poorest states in India. By conventional reckoning Andhra Pradesh wouldn’t be poor, and West Bengal, while not poor, has certainly had some economic hard times as of late. The other two, most people would count as poor states.
If UK aid was ended there is no guarentee that the poorest states would be ‘topped’ up central government. Central allocations to states are based on the “Gadgil formula” which the Indian central Planning Commission uses to determine the allocation of central funds to the states. This is how it goes – feel free to correct fiscal experts if I’ve got this wrong – allocations are largely (60%) based on population size, with the rest accounted for by income per capita, tax collection, irrigation and power projects and ‘special problems’. There are also transfers under centrally sponsored and central sector schemes and a third category of transfer that is known as the ad hoc transfer and is non-formulaic. In short, remove aid from the poorest states and there is no guarantee of a top up.
What could DFID and donors do differently?
i. Focus on poor people, not poor countries
If the focus of aid is poor people not poor countries then the low income/middle income country way of looking at the world needs a rethink. DFID could switch its aid allocation metrics to fit DFID’s mission – ie from poor countries (low or middle income countries) to poor people. The new Oxford University and UN multidimensional poverty index (MPI) measure might be one alternative tool. But there are many others.
ii. Think beyond traditional aid
Maybe aid is no longer about money transfers with MICs. There is the ‘do no harm’ agenda – designing favourable and coherent development policies on remittances and migration, trade preferences, climate negotiations and climate financing, as well as tax havens – and a case for making aid increasingly about global public goods (and the importance of MICs support to these) and multilateralism, especially in middle-income countries and where aid might be channelled through the United Nations Children’s Fund, for example, or a new global fund for cash transfers to households as a direct poverty and redistributive measure.
OR maybe MICs may not want traditional aid at all.
iii. See equity and shared prosperity as a global and donor concern not just a domestic issue
More equitable countries reduce poverty faster, and stubborn asset, gender or identity inequality (ie caste systems) might begin to explain persistent poverty amid wealth in MICs. This entails some thinking on what aid is for and it’s role perhaps in supporting political voice of the poor and marginalized in policy processes. Any attempt to discuss inequality will be viewed as an infringement on political sovereignty but is domestic inequality solely a domestic issue if it hinders the effectiveness of aid? And it’s not just UN agencies such as UNICEF talking about equity even the IMF thinks inequality is now real concern as it slows down poverty reduction.
What is more of a mystery is why India accepts aid that amounts to 0.1-0.2% of GNI. Could it be:
Path dependency – it’s always happened so why stop now?
Or foreign policy relationship maintenance – why rock the boat?
Or is it that aid is doing good in the poorer states so why stop even if the central government could fund it?
Or something else?
And a final thought, after India, what about aid to Ghana? Which is due to graduate to middle income status next year…
Posted by Madhura at 12:04 PM 1 comments
Labels: Economic Growth and Development, Foreign Aid, Poverty
Thursday, March 4, 2010
Poverty estimates vs food entitlements
http://www.hindu.com/2010/02/24/stories/2010022456271200.htm
By Jean Drèze
Statistical poverty lines should not become real-life eligibility criteria for food entitlements.
Nothing is easier than to recognise a poor person when you see him or her. Yet the task of identifying and counting the poor seems to elude the country’s best experts. Take for instance the “headcount” of rural poverty — the proportion of the rural population below the poverty line. At least four alternative figures are available: 28 per cent from the Planning Commission, 50 per cent from the N.C. Saxena Committee report, 42 per cent from the Tendulkar Committee report, and 80 per cent or so from the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS).
On closer examination, the gaps are not as big as they look, because they are largely due to the differences in poverty lines. The underlying methodologies are much the same. The main exception is the Saxena Committee report, where the 50 per cent figure is based on an independent argument about the required coverage of the BPL Census. Other reports produce alternative figures by simply shifting the poverty line.
In this connection, it is important to remember that the poverty line is, ultimately, little more than an arbitrary benchmark. It is difficult to give it a normative interpretation (in this respect, the Tendulkar Committee report is far from convincing). The notion that everyone below a certain expenditure threshold is “poor,” while everyone else is “not poor,” makes little sense. Poverty is a matter of degree and to the extent that any particular threshold can be specified, it is likely to depend on the context of the exercise.
What tends to matter is not so much the level of the benchmark as consistency in applying it in different places and years (by using suitable “cost-of-living indexes” to adjust the benchmark), for comparative purposes. It is this consistency that is being threatened by the current mushrooming of independent poverty lines. In this respect, the Tendulkar Committee report does a reasonably good job of arguing for the adoption of the current, national, official urban poverty line as an “anchor.” State-wise urban and rural poverty lines are to be derived from it by applying suitable price indexes generated from the National Sample Survey data. This approach permits continuity with earlier poverty series, consistency of poverty estimation between sectors and States, and some method in the madness from now on.
As it happens, the Tendulkar Committee report’s estimate of 42 per cent for rural poverty, based on this new poverty line, is not very different from the 50 per cent benchmark proposed in the Saxena Committee for the coverage of the BPL Census. In fact, the Tendulkar estimate, plus a very conservative margin of 10 per cent or so for targeting errors, would produce much the same figure as in the Saxena Committee report. Thus, one could argue for “50 per cent” as an absolute minimum for the coverage of the next BPL Census in rural areas.
However, poverty estimation is one thing, and social support is another. The main purpose of the BPL Census is to identify households eligible for social support, notably through the Public Distribution System (PDS) but also, increasingly, in other ways. In deciding the coverage of the BPL Census, allowance must be made not only for targeting errors, which can be very large, but also for other considerations, including the fact that under-nutrition rates in India tend to be much higher than poverty estimates. This gap is not so surprising, considering that the official “poverty line” is really a destitution line. The consumption basket that can be bought at the poverty line is extremely meagre. It was an important contribution of the NCEUS report to point out that even a moderately enhanced poverty line basket, costing Rs.20 per person per day, would be unaffordable for a large majority of the population. How would you like to live on Rs. 20 a day?
Also relevant here is the case for a universal as opposed to targeted PDS. The main argument is that the Right to Food is a fundamental right of all citizens (an aspect of the “Right to Life” under Article 21 of the Constitution), and that any targeting method inevitably entails substantial “exclusion errors.” This raises the question of the BPL Census methodology.
The 2002 BPL Census was based on a rather convoluted scoring method, involving 13 different indicators (related for instance to land ownership, occupation and education) with a score of 0 to 4 for each indicator, so that the aggregate score ranged from 0 to 52. There were serious conceptual flaws in this scoring system, and the whole method was also applied in a haphazard manner, partly due to its confused character. The result was a very defective census that left out large numbers of poor households. According to the 61st round of the National Sample Survey, among the poorest 20 per cent of rural households in 2004-05, barely half had a BPL Card. Any future BPL Census exercise must be based on a clear recognition of this major fiasco.
The Saxena Committee recently proposed an alternative BPL Census methodology, involving a simplified scoring system. Instead of 13 indicators, there are just five, with an aggregate score ranging from 0 to 10. This is a major improvement. Even this simplified method, however, is likely to be hard to comprehend for many rural households. This lack of transparency opens the door to manipulation, and undermines participatory verification of the BPL list. There is no guarantee that the results will be much better than those of the 2002 BPL Census.
Perhaps the proposed method can be further improved. But the bottom line is that any BPL Census is likely to be a bit of a hit-or-miss affair, not only because of inherent conceptual problems but also because of widespread irregularities on the ground. This is the main argument for universal provision of basic services, including access to the PDS. Another strong argument is that targeting is divisive, and undermines the unity of public demand for a functional PDS. It is perhaps no accident that the PDS works much better in Tamil Nadu, where it is universal, than in other States.
A universal PDS would, of course, involve a major increase in the food subsidy. However, universalisation could be combined with cost-saving measures such as decentralised procurement, self-management of Fair Price Shops by gram panchayats, and a range of transparency safeguards. There is no obvious alternative, if we are serious about ensuring food security for all. If someone has a better idea, let’s hear it.
Meanwhile, the government seems to be running in the opposite direction, judging from the recent recommendations of the Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) in charge of the proposed National Food Security Act. The EGoM suggested not only that the government’s legal obligation to provide foodgrain under PDS should be restricted to 25 kg per month for BPL families, but also that the Planning Commission’s measly poverty figures should be used as a “ceiling” for the BPL list. This amounts to disregarding at least three official committee reports (Tendulkar, N.C. Saxena and NCEUS), and trivialising the proposed Act.
In a country where half of all children are underweight, the idea that freedom from hunger and under-nutrition can be made a legal right is rather bold and far-reaching. It has a bearing not only on the Public Distribution System but also on a range of other interventions and entitlements, relating for instance to child nutrition, social security, health care, and even property rights. Framing an effective National Food Security Act requires a great deal of creative work, public debate, and political commitment. Alas, seven months after the Finance Minister stated, in his previous budget speech, that work on the Act had “begun in right earnest,” and that a draft would be in the public domain “very soon,” things seem to be moving backward rather than forward. Let us see what the Honourable Minister has to say on this in his forthcoming budget speech.
(The author is Visiting Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Allahabad.)
Posted by Madhura at 12:16 PM 0 comments
Labels: Articles, BPL in India, Food Security, Poverty
Thursday, December 24, 2009
India on 20 cents a day
http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/2670
November 26, 2006
By Aseem Shrivastava
Aseem Shrivastava's ZSpace Page
The World Bank - which has to be applauded for having made the first such attempt started making international comparisons of poverty only about two decades back. For obvious reasons of convenience it developed two simple notions of poverty. The US Treasury being the power behind the institution, and the dollar being the reserve currency by design, the lower poverty line was set at $1 a day per capita. Those below it were considered to be "the poorest of the poor". The upper poverty line was set at $2 a day. Those living on $1-2 a day were still poor, but not as badly off. The updated numbers today, corrected for inflation, are $1.08 and $2.15.
The vagaries of purchasing power (dis)parities
However, there was a problem. It was realized that $1 goes much farther in purchasing necessary items of consumption in a poor country compared to a rich one. (Moreover, exchange rates do not take into account non-traded goods.) Using prevailing exchange rates, Rs.45 can buy more in
Using widely quoted World Bank numbers on GDP, this conversion factor for a country like
The most recent World Bank estimates for
I have asked several non-experts abroad who have traveled to India, and are thus somewhat familiar with market exchange rates, how they interpret the $1 a day or $2 a day figure. The answer is: literally. In other words, they think that really poor Indians (35% of the population) live on less than Rs.45 and less poor Indians (another 45% of the population) live on between Rs.45-90 a day. In their imagination that is bad enough for Western countries to send aid to poor countries.
However, if their belief was in fact correct then (assuming Rs.20 a day to be the minimum needed to supply the 2200 calories of food intake – and minimal nutrition - that agricultural economists and the UN take to be the survival norm appropriately averaged across age groups, locations and kinds of labor) at least the additional 450-500 million who would be living in the Rs.45-90 a day range would be well out of poverty. In fact, a substantial proportion of the people living under the lower poverty line would be out of poverty too. There might perhaps remain some 50 to 100 million poor, malnourished Indians whose long-term welfare could easily be looked after by the prosperity all around.
Not only would Indian politicians, government officials, businessmen and heir consultants be jumping out of their seats in sheer disbelief that their superpower fantasies may actually be realized, but if this state of affairs was representative of the impoverished world as a whole, the World Bank would be out of business, their achieved goal of a "world free of poverty" having ironically led them there!
Sadly, the reality is closer to "a world free of the poor". Thanks to the subtleties of PPP calculations it may quite possibly be the case that the number of people across the world who are not able to meet the minimum standards for adequate nutrition is anywhere from 3 to 4 billion, rather than the officially estimated 2.7 billion who are estimated to be living under $2 a day. No one really knows. In other words, we could all be off by a whole continent!
Some experts in the field, such as Sanjay Reddy of Columbia University or Robert Wade of the London School of Economics advise deep skepticism about prevailing official estimates, especially of alleged changes thereof on account of globalization. Wade advocates that "the political economy of statistics" is crucial and argues for greater competition in the market for the generation of international poverty data, so far a de facto monopoly of the World Bank. No free market there! There is intense debate among economists and policy-makers as to just how much poverty there is in the world and whether it is going up or down with globalization. According to one expert Angus Deaton, "it seems impossible to make statements about changes in world poverty when the ground underneath one's feet is changing in this way."
Where do the World Bank experts go wrong? A few of them are even known to this writer, and are reliable people of otherwise unimpeachable integrity. Being a drop-out economist myself I appreciate the trials and tribulations of the economists and statisticians at the World Bank who compute the numbers on poverty. It is a harrowing mine-field of data they must negotiate on a daily basis in order to arrive at the sort of numbers the world and its policy-makers are interested in. The challenge of measuring poverty and the (changes thereof) accurately, in a world as diverse, complex and dynamic as ours, is immense. But after decades of effort by trained statisticians it should have become possible by now to arrive at somewhat reliable numbers.
The problem is, at bottom, be political, rather than one of expertise. The very fact that when making comparisons between enriched and impoverished countries, all monetary magnitudes have to be inflated significantly to get a sense of real values in the poor world should have been a matter of great ethical concern to economists, something to make them wonder as to how things got to this point. In a world of markets stretched across mountainously uneven playing fields, pricing is determined not so much by the real costs (to human labor and to nature) incurred but by historically determined economic forces like the willingness and ability to pay. Typically, the latter are shaped in profound ways by legacies of inequalities in wealth and power which mainstream economists are trained to avoid taking into account while preparing their advocacy of "free" markets. In the real world, as against the general equilibrium models microeconomists are schooled in, few things are as politically shaped and formed as the structure of relative prices. In particular, the price of labor – wages – is almost entirely a matter of bargaining, as also, we are realizing, the price of utilizing nature.
Moreover, in our increasingly packaged consumerist world even global poverty figures must ultimately arrive in a wrapping that is not unpalatably unattractive to the public. Trickle-down will ultimately work, we are repeatedly assured by growth economists. But like the late John Kenneth Galbraith is said to have remarked acerbically, faith in trickle-down is a bit like feeding race horses superior oats so that starving sparrows can forage in their dung. All indications, especially in parts of the world like rural
Numbed (by the numbers)
In a world which has been brought up to regard numerical precision as a sign of scientific rigor, it easily gets forgotten (especially by mainstream economists) that poverty is not merely a matter of numbers. Numbers can only tell us about what the experts call "income poverty". Modern standards of living involve large amounts of intangibles and social consumption, known to economists as "public goods": drinking water, public sanitation, health and education are only some of the services which people in rich countries take for granted because they have been traditionally guaranteed by the state (though in recent years private corporations have queued up, often successfully – especially in impoverished countries – to take control and possession of these services). When these are taken into account it becomes clear that what the experts call the "poverty line" is actually more accurately labeled "starvation line", as some people will have it. Many Indian economists have been advocating a serious upward revision of the poverty line in order to get a better grasp of the economic reality.
Economists have tried to remedy the situation by evolving during the last few decades the Human Development Index (HDI), calculated and issued by the UNDP every year. It tries to take into account life expectancy (as an indicator of health) and levels of adult literacy and enrolment (as indicators of education), apart from considering per capita incomes. It is certainly an improvement over raw numbers for poverty. And yet, if
Perhaps, we would do well to remember Einstein's counsel: "Everything that can be counted does not necessarily count; everything that counts cannot necessarily be counted." The poverty measurement industry loses much sleep and sweat over details that do not matter much. The big picture, perhaps unsurprisingly, is inaccurately reported. The propaganda efforts of governments and corporations succeed in the end in keeping some of the more terrible effects of prevailing economic policies from clear public view, undermining democratic transparency and potential accountability.
Rather than get drowned in swirling oceans of data, we might look for the prominent ridges on the gyrating currents of the monetized economy. However, it is then important to locate them precisely and, crucially, label and flag them accurately. Busy readers don't have time to interpret the fine print. And public patience with economists wears thin.
We only count and measure what is useful, important or interesting. By measuring we indicate that we care about what is measured. The score on poverty, especially if it is shameful, is worth keeping, if only to remind us of the extent of the failure of globalization not merely to change the lives of the poor but perhaps in turning them for the worse. (If China has lifted tens of millions of families out of poverty, the secret of their success lies in the years and decades preceding globalization – in the early 1980s rural reforms were carried out, among other things, granting access to land to the rural poor. Besides, the strong foundations of the social infrastructure – education and health – were laid down in the era of communism. Globalization has only allowed the country to reap the harvest of pre-existing investments better.)
If global poverty statistics are not disseminated accurately, the facts on the ground will only get worse – thanks to misinformed policy-making among other things – and will one day command dreadful obedience from one and all. The rulers of the day risk the implications of Colin Powell's faux pas a few years back - of boasting that the number of dead Iraqi civilians did not interest him very much. And the potential consequences across the globe could be as catastrophic as what
Aseem Shrivastava is an independent writer. He can be reached at aseem62@yahoo.com
Posted by Madhura at 3:04 PM 0 comments
Labels: Articles, Aseem Shrivastava, Economic Growth and Development, Food Security, Poverty, Purchasing Power Parity, World Bank, www.zcommunications.org
